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BY the general rule the beneficiary of a trust may alienate his
interest freely. He may transfer this interest in part or in
whole, inter vivos or by will, for consideration or without. A
cestui que trust is possessed of the ability to transfer his equitable
interest to the same extent that he has the power to transfer a
comparable legal interest.' Furthermore, the cestui's creditors may
cause an involuntary alienation of his interest in order to satisfy the
the debts by him to them.2 Therefore, the interest is not only volun-
tarily transferable, but also involuntarily transferable; that is,
it is susceptive to execution to satisfy the claims of the beneficiary's
creditors.
A settlor or donor of a trust is often desirous of providing a
fund in order to maintain the beneficiary and to protect the fund
against a beneficiary's improvidence or incapacity. The settlor
thus wishes to create a trust with provisions restricting the aliena-
tion of the trust fund by the voluntary act of the beneficiary, or
involuntarily, by the beneficiary's creditors. This he may do in
most jurisdictions, and such trusts in which the interest of the
cestui cannot be transferred by him or reached by his creditors,
have been dubbed by the somewhat inappropriate name, spend-
thrift trusts. The name is an anomaly inasmuch as the personal
financial habits or the incapacity of the cesui que trust are unim-
portant.3 A trust may be set up for a beneficiary who is a com-
I Chase v. York County Savings Bank. 89 Tex. 316. 35 S. W. 406 (1896): McNeill V.
Masterson. 79 Tex. 67. 15 S.W. 673 (1891); Woodward v. Snow. 233 Mass. 267. 124
N. E. 35 (1919); Zelley v. Zelley. 101 N. J. Eq. 37. 136 Ad. 738 (1927) ; Warmsrey v.
Tanfeld, 1 Ch. Rep. 29 (1628) ; RESTATEMENT TRUSTS §§ 132. 135. 140 (1935).
2 Hoover v. First Nat. Bank. 192 S. W. 1149 (Tex. Comm. App. 1917); Chase v.
York County Savings Bank. 89 Tex. 316. 36 S. W. 406 (1896).
s Adams v. Williams. 112 Tex. 469. 248 S. W. 673 (Tex. Comm. App. 1923) ; Wag-




pletely competent person. In fact, the beneficiary may be a trustee
under the terms of the trust instrument.4 However, the settlor him-
salf may not be a beneficiary under the trust.' In such a case a
restraint on voluntary or involuntary alienation is void.
The question immediately arises as to the validity of a re-
straint upon the alienation of the beneficiary's interest. Certainly
a restraint on the alienation of a legal estate is usually held in-
valid, and in England this rule has prevailed with respect to the
spendthrift trust, as evidenced by the leading case of Brandon v.
Robinson." There a father devised and bequeathed real and per-
sonal property upon trust to pay the income to his son for life, and
after the son's death to pay the principal to his next of kin. A
spendthrift clause was inserted to the effect that such income
"should not be grantable, transferable, or otherwise assignable,
by way of anticipation of any unreceived payment or any part
thereof."7 After the death of the testator the son become a bank-
rupt, and the assignee in bankruptcy brought suit to reach the
beneficiary's interest under the trust. It was held that the restraint
on alienation was ineffective and that the assignee in bankruptcy
could reach the interest. However, it was recognized that a for-
feiture for alienation would be valid. In other words, there could
be inserted in a trust instrument words stating that the beneficiary's
interest should be terminated if the beneficiary should attempt to
transfer his interest, or his creditors should attempt to reach it,
or he should become bankrupt. Such a provision would be upheld,
for in such instance there is no attempt to permit the beneficiary
to continue to hold and enjoy the interest notwithstanding his
' Neely v. Brodgen, 139 S. W. 192 (Tex. Comm. App. 1922) : It is stated at Section
152, comment (m) of the Restatement of Trusts, "The rule stated in this section [as
to validity of spendthrift trusts] is applicable even though the beneficiary or one of
the beneficiaries is one of several trustees, or one of several beneficiaries is* the sole
trustee. A person, however, cannot be both sole beneficiary and sole trustee of a trust."
• Brown v. MacGill. 87 Md. 161, 39 Atl. 613 (1898) ; ScoTT ON Tnusrs, § 156 (1939)
RE.STATEMENT TRUSTS § 156 (1935).




transfer or his failure to pay his creditors. A spendthrift provision
inserted in a trust for a married woman was also distinguished,
and it was stated that such a restraint would be valid, for a mar-
ried woman was not sui juris. Since equity made her the owner
of the interest and permitted her to alien, equity might also limit
her power over the interest by permitting a restriction.
Thus, the English rule denies the validity of restraints upon
alienation and declares them to be void in the absence of a gift
over in case of transfer of the interest by the cestui or insolvency
of the beneficiary. However, most American courts, including the
courts of Texas,' have taken a contrary view recognizing the
validity of a provision in a trust restraining the alienation of the
interest of the cestui, thus preventing his interest from being
reached by creditors and preventing voluntary alienation. The
Massachusetts court, in Broadway National Bamk v. Adams9 ex-
presses the American view. In this case the plaintiff instituted a
bill in equity to reach the income of a trust, created for the de-
fendent during his life free from the interference or control of his
creditors. The settlor further stated his intention that the use of
the income should not be anticipated by assignment. The court in
upholding the spendthrift provision recognized but rejected the
common law rule to the effect that there may not be attached to a
transfer of property a condition that it shall not be alienated. The
common law view was that "by such a condition the grantor under-
takes to deprive the property in the hands of the grantee of one of
its legal incidents and attributes, namely its alienability, which is
deemed to be against public policy."'"
The court in refuting the common law rule reasoned as fol-
lows:
"By the creation of a trust like the one before us, the trust property
passes to the trustee with all its incidents and attributes unimpaired.
S Estes v. Estes, 255 S. W. 649 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923); af'd. 267 S. W. 709 (Tex.
Comm. App. 1924) ; Gamble v. Dabney, 20 Tex. 69 (1875).




He takes the whole legal title to the property, with the power of aliena-
tion; the cestui que trust takes the whole legal title to the accrued in-
come at the moment it is paid over to him. Neither the principal nor the
income is at any time inalienable.""1
The court held that the settlor could give the beneficiary a
restricted estate by providing that such beneficiary could not
alienate it by anticipation and that his creditors could not reach
it through any process of law or equity. The court was of the
belief that since the donor was the absolute owner of the property,
that he could dispose of it as he desired with any limitations there-
on not repugnant to law. Restrictions providing against the im-
providence or ill-fortune of the beneficiary were not contrary to
the general welfare even in the face of the rule of public policy
which subjects a debtor's property to the payment of his debts. It
was further believed that there was no element of fraud on the
creditors of the beneficiary because as stated:
"... creditors have no right to reply on property thus held and to
give him (the beneficiary] credit upon the basis of an estate which,
by the instrument creating it, is declared to be inalienable by him, and
not liable for his debts. By the exercise of proper diligence they can
ascertain the nature and extent of his estate, especially in the Common-
wealth where all wills and most deeds are spread upon the public
records"1z
CREATION OF SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS
In order to bring about the creation of a spendthrift trust,
it is not necessary that the settlor use any specific or particular
form of words. However, it is said that the language or wording
of the trust instrument itself must show an intent to restrain aliena-
tion of the beneficiary's interest." It is not difficult to determine
the creation of such a trust when express words are used. For
example, it might be stated in the trust instrument that the income
11 Id. at 172.
2 Id. at 173.
'- Jones v. Ready. 27 U. S. 642 (1926); Nunn v. Titche-Goettinger Co., 245 S. W.
421 (TeL Comm App. 1922).
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to the beneficiary during his life is to be free from the interference
or control of creditors and is not to be paid out by way of anticipa-
tion or assignment. The settlor may express that the income shall
be paid to the beneficiary for life without his having the power to
sell, assign, pledge, mortgage or otherwise dispose of such income
previous to its payment to him, and that such income shall not be
subject to liability for his debts. Again, the trust instrument may
provide simply that the income shall be paid to the beneficiary
and to no one else whether claiming by his authority or otherwise.
In each instance a spendthrift trust is created.
If the settlor manifests an intent in express terms that the
beneficiary should be restrained from a voluntary alienation, those
words may also show an intention that the interest should not be
subject to the demands of his creditors. Conversely, the settlor may
impose in express language a restraint only upon involuntary
alienation of the beneficiary's interest, and at the same time evince
an intent to restrain a voluntary alienation. 4
A question arises as to the validity of a provision in the trust
which restrains involuntary alienation, but permits voluntary
alienation of the cestui's interest. Such a provision has been held
effective to preclude resort by the trustee in bankruptcy to the
interest of the beneficiary where there was no restraint on volun-
tary alienation, but the trust instrument declared that the interest
of a life beneficiary should be free from the interference or con-
trol of the beneficiary's creditors.'" The Supreme Court seemed
to indicate in its opinion, however, that there was an implied re-
straint on voluntary alienation also. It would seem that to permit
voluntary alienation and to protect the interest from the claims of
creditors would be contrary to sound public policy, but it has
been permitted by some courts.' 6
14 Berry v. Dunham. 202 Mass. 133. 88 N. E. 904 (1909) ; Nickerson v. Van Horn,
181 Mass. 562. 64 N. E. 204 (1902).
15 Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Luke. 220 Mass. 494. 108 N. E. 64 (1915)
20 'd. sub. nom. Eaton v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co.. 2.40 U. S. 427 (1916).
16 SCOTT, op. cit. supra note 5. at § 152.3.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
If the interest may be so protected from involuntary aliena-
tion, it would certainly seem that the converse of the situation
would be permitted. That is, an instance wherein the trust makes
no provision to exempt the equity from the claims of creditors, but
does restrict voluntary alienation would seem permissible. It is
apparent that there would be less objection to permitting restraint
upon voluntary transfer than in a provision preventing his credi-
tors from subjecting it to claims. A rather peculiar situation might
arise where there is a provision against voluntary transfer and
none against involuntary alienation and the beneficiary assigns
his interest for value. In such a case, since the assignee may not
actually reach the interest under the assignment, he is still entitled
to recover the amount thus paid as a creditor of the beneficiary,
since under the trust there is no restraint on the subjecting of the
beneficiary's interest to the claims of creditors.17
As has been stated, there is no rigid formula by which to
evidence the creation of a spendthrift trust. The settlor must mani-
fest the desire to restrain the transfer of the cestui's interest, and
such intent must appear from the terms of the trust. The general
rule is that extrinsic evidence is not admissable to show the set-
tlor's intention to create such a trust. If there is no intention mani-
fested in the trust instrument the cestui cannot offer evidence that
the donor actually intended to create a spendthrift trust, since he,
the cestui, was improvident or wasteful.'8 Courts have, however,
found an intention to impose restraint where there was very little
to indicate such an intent in the the trust instrument. The Texas
courts seem to have gone further still, permitting extrinsic evi-
dence to show such intent where there was nothing in the trust
instrument manifesting it. For example, where there was no in-
timation in the instrument that a spendthrift trust was to be
created, the courts have taken into consideration the fact that the
beneficiary was improvident or that a father (settlor) was obsessed
17 Ibid.
18 RESTATEMENT TRUsTs 1 152. Comment (f) (1935).
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with the idea that a son (beneficiary) would waste the property."
However, it has also been held in Texas that there must be words in
the instrument to the effect that the settlor intended to create a
spendthrift trust.20 Therefore, there would seem to be conflict upon
this point, but it is obvious that the Texas courts have been very
liberal and are apt to find the intention to impose restraint on
alienation. Even in the absence of language making the interest
of the beneficiary inalienable, the courts find an intent to restrain
alienation if the trust property is to be used for the support of
the beneficiary or if the trust instrument gives to the trustee un-
controlled discretion as to the amounts to be paid to the cestui.2"
RESTRAINT ON ALIENATION OF INCOME AND RESTRAINT ON
ALIENATION OF PRINCIPAL
The ordinary spendthrift trust provides for restraint on the
alienation of the income. It is usually stated that the beneficiary
is entitled to the income from the trust property for life, or for
a term of years, that he may not dispose of his right to future
income may not be subjected to the claims of his creditors. In such
instance the income which is to accrue in the future is not subject
to voluntary or involuntary alienation. If the beneficiary assigns
or makes a contract to assign this restricted interest, the assign-
ment is ineffective and the contract is not specifically enforce-
able, although the beneficiary will be personally liable for breach
of contract. Nevertheless, income which has accrued and has
actually been paid to the beneficiary by the trustee may be freely
transferred or reached by his creditors.22 On the other hand, in-
19 Linsey v. Rose, 175 S. W. 829 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915) ; Patten v. Herring, 9 Civ.
App. 640. 29 S. W. 388 (1895).
20 Nunn v. Titche-Goettinger, 245 S. W. 421 (Tex. Comm. App. 1922).
21 However such trust would either be a trust for support or a discretionary trust
and is to be distinguished from a spendthrift trust since in the former "it is the nature
of the beneficiary's interest rather than a provision forbidding alienation which pre-
vents the transfer of the beneficiary's interest." RESTATE.MFNT TRUSTS § 154 (1935).
22 ScoTr, op. cit. supra note 5. at § 152.5; GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRusTs § 370
(1936); RESTATEMENT TiusTS § 152 comment (j) (1935).
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come accrued and received by the trustee, which has not yet been
paid to the cestui, is still subject to the restraint. It may not be
reached by creditors until paid over to the cestui and until that
time he may not assign."3 However, if the cestui assigns his right
to this income received by the trustee but not yet paid, such assign-
ment has been held effective as a revocable authorization to the
trustee. If the trustee pays the income as it accrues to the assignee
before revocation of the assignment, the beneficiary is unable to
force the trustee to pay again and cannot recover the amount from
the assignee.2 It has been determined by some authority that the
assignment is valid, not only as to income accrued at the time of
the assignment, but also as to future income which accrued before
the assignment was revoked by the beneficiary.26
The contention has been made that the spendthrift trust can
preserve the beneficiarys right to future income only and that
protection cannot be extended to his right to future principal. In
other words, may alienation of the beneficiary's right to future
principal be restrained? There has been conflict on this question
in jurisdictions recognizing the validity of restraint as to future
income. The reluctance of courts to extend the spendthrift doctrine
to the right to receive principal has been based upon the idea that
there should be no restraint on alienation of the actual corpus of
the trust, the ownership itself.2 6 The situation is analagous to an
attempted restraint on the alienation of a fee simple in land law,
which is prevented by a strong rule of public policy.
The issue presents itself in the following types of cases:
1. Under the terms of the trust the beneficiary is entitled to
have the trust property paid or conveyed to him immediately, or
23 Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Luke. 220 Mass. 484. 108 N. E. 64 (1915).
aff'd sub nom. Eaton v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co.. 240 U. S. 427 (1916).
24 Matter of Perlmutter, 156 Misc. 571, 282 N. Y. Supp. 282 (1935) ; KeeleWs' Eatate,
334 Pa. 225. 3 A. (2d) 413 (1939).
25 Matter of Lynch. 151 Misc. 549. 272 N. Y. Supp. 79 (1934) ; Matter of Bechtoldt,
148 Misc. 8. 266 N. Y. Supp. 408 (1933).
26 ScoTT. op. cit. supra note S. at 1 153.
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at any time he may request. An attempted restraint on alienation
of the principal in this case is invalid.27
2. Under the terms of the trust a beneficiary is entitled to
the principal after a certain period but is not entitled to the income
during the period. For example, X conveys to A in trust, income
to be paid to C for life, and at C's death the principal to be con-
veyed to D. A restraint on alienation is placed on D's interest so
that a voluntary transfer cannot be made and creditors may not
reach it in legal or equitable proceedings. The conclusion has been
reached that public policy forbids a restraint on D's right to re-
ceive the principal,2" but some jurisdictions, including Texas, have
reached a differing view.29
3. Under the terms of the trust the beneficiary is entitled to
the income for a certain period and at the expiration of that period
the principal is to be paid to him or his estate. A restraint is im-
posed on the alienation of the beneficiary's interest in both income
and principal. Generally, the restraint on the income is held to be
effective, but the restraint on the beneficiary's interest in the prin-
cipal is held to be ineffective.3" A minority of states, again in-
cluding Texas, have determined that the restraint upon both prin-
cipal and income is valid. 1
SPENDTHRIFT TRUST INVALID AS TO CERTAIN CLAIMANTS
Although a spendthrift provision in a trust instrument pro-
tects the beneficiary's interest as to claims of creditors, particular
21 Morgan's Estate (No. 1). 223 Pa. 228. 72 Atl. 498 (1909): RESTATEMENT TRusTs
§.151, comment (b) (1935) ; but see contra Darling v. Dodge. 200 Iowa 1303. 306 N. W.
266 (1925).
2 RESTATEMENT TRUSTS § 151. comment (c) (1935).
29 Caples v. Buell. 243 S. W. 1066 (Tex. Comm. App. 1922'; Haskell v. Haskell,
234 Mass. 442. 125 N. E. 601 (1920) : see Scorr op. cit. supra note 5. at § 153.2 for
discussion on this point.
so Vellacott v. Murphy. 16 F. (2d) 700 (C. C. A. 5th 1927) cert denied, 273 U. S.
767 (1927) ; Clark v. Clark. 121 Tex. 165. 46 S. W. (2d) 658 (1932) ; Caples v. Ward,
107 Tex. 341. 179 S. W. 856 (1915). RESTATEMENT TRUSTS § 153 (1935)
31 Caples v. Buell, 243 S. W. 1066 (Tex. Comm. App. 1922); Erickson v. Erickson,
197 Minn. 71. 266 N. W. 161. 267 N. W. 426 (1936) ; Beek's Estate. 133 Pa. 51. 19 Ad.
842 (1890) ; see ScoTT op. cit. supra note 5. at § 153.3 for discussion on this point.
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classes of claimants have been permitted to reach the interest of
the cestui. It would seem that the wife and children of the bene-
ficiary should be able to subject his interest to claims for support,
on the ground that it was not the intention of the settlor to exempt
the interest from their claims.3" Even when the settlor did intend
to exclude them, it has been held that the wife and children could
enforce their claims for support, inasmuch as public policy de-
mands that the beneficiary should not be enabled to enjoy the
income and refuse to support his dependents. 3 Some cases, how-
ever, have reached a contrary view by construing the trust instru-
ment in such a way as to make no exception to the spendthrift
provisions.3 ' Claims for necessary services rendered to the bene-
ficiary or supplies furnished to him are excluded, however, since
the purpose of a spendthrift trust is to protect the beneficiary
against his own improvidence, and a claim for necessaries does
not derogate from such purpose but furthers it. 5 Claims for serv-
ices rendered the beneficiary in the protection of his interest in
the trust estate itself may be enforced, even though the interest
is subject to a spendthrift provision. 6 Certainly claims of the
government, such as claims for unpaid taxes, may be enforced
against the beneficiary's interest. 7 Moreover, it would seem that
a tort creditor would be able to reach the interest."'
In an instance where the income is payable to a beneficiary
32 Keller v. Keller, 284 II1. App. 198, 1 N. E. (2d) 773 (1936) ; Thomas v. Thomas,
112 Pa. Super. 578, 172 At. 36 (1934).
33 Ibid; RESTATEMENT TRUSTS § 157 (1935). In Texas it has been held that when
the cestui of a spendthrift trust is a married person, the income, when received, Is
community property and not subject to federal income tax as the separate property
of the cestui. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Porter. 148 F. (2d) 566 (C. C. A.
5th 1945).
-4 Canfield v. Security Trust Nat. Bank. 8 Cal. App. (2d) 277. 48 P. (2d) 733
(1935) ; Erickson v. Erickson. 197 Minn. 71. 266 N. W. 161. 267 N. W. 426 (1936).
R5 Pole v. Pieisch, 61 Md. 570 (18841 ; Matter of Berrien, 147 Misc. 788. 264 N. Y.
Supp. 593 (1933); RESTATEMENT TRUSTS § 157 clause (b) (1935).
36 Matter of Williams. 187 N. Y. 286. 79 N. E. 1019 (1907) ; RESTATEMENT TRUSTS
§ 157 clause (c) (1935).
87 United States v. Dallas Nat. Bank. 152 F. (2d) 582 (C. C. A. 5th 1945): Matter
of Rosenberg. 269 N. Y. 247. 199 N. E. 206 (1935).
-1 Scorr. op. cit. supra note 5. at § 157.5.
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and subject to restraint on alienation, if the beneficiary is an infant
or under a disability, the appointed guardian of his property can
compel the trustee to pay the income to him even though the bene-
ficiary's interest is not otherwise transferable by the terms of the
trust. 9 Upon the death of the beneficiary his personal representa-
tive is entitled to accrued income which has not yet been paid to
the beneficiary."
CONCLUSION
The desirability of upholding a spendthrift trust has been
strongly debated. Those opposing spendthrift trusts do so in part
on technical legal grounds. It is said that such trusts do restrain
alienation and since legal life estates or estates in fee may not
be subjected to such restraints, there is no reason that equitable
interests should be permitted to be encumbered. On grounds of
public policy it is contended that spendthrift provisions show a
trend toward paternalism and socialism and that they protect and
encourage incompetency and weakness. Moreover, it is said that
such trusts are misleading to the creditors of the beneficiary.
On the other hand, it is argued with equal vigor that there
is really no restraint in the case of such a trust because the trustee
may alienate the legal title and the beneficiary may alienate his
interest once it becomes due and is paid to him. Furthermore, it
is thought not to be against public policy with respect to the mis-
leading of creditors since the creditors by diligence may ascertain
the restriction. It is also stated that a donor should be permitted
to do with his property as he wishes and that it is not desirable
for a beneficiary of a trust to waste or squander his inheritance,
especially where he is a person of improvident habits and weak
in intellect."' R. W. Woolsey.
39 Brookshire v. Wambough, 9 S. W. 2d 269 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928); Bradshaw V.
Lucas, 214 111. App. 218 (1919); Gosquet v. Pollock, I App. Div. 512. 37 N. Y. Supp.
357 (1896) ; aFld. mem. 158 N. Y. 734. 53 N. E. 1125 (1899); RESTATEM.NT TatusTs
1 158 clause (1) (1935).
40 Welsh v. Apthorp, 203 Mass. 249. 89 N. E. 432 (1909); RESTATEMEYT TRusTs
1 158 clause (2) (1935).
41 For arguments pro and con with respect to spendthrift trust see: BOCErT oX
TausTs 163-165 (2d ed. 1942) and ScoTt, op. cit. supra note 5, at § 152.
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